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THE POSS-ABILITY PRINCIPLE, G-CASES, 
AND FITCH PROPOSITIONS 
Noah GORDON 
 
ABSTRACT: There is a very plausible principle linking abilities and possibilities: If S is able 
to Φ, then it is metaphysically possible that S Φ’s. Jack Spencer recently proposed a class of 
counterexamples to this principle involving the ability to know certain propositions. I 
renew an argument against these counterexamples based on the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions. In doing so, I provide a new argument for the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions and show that Spencer’s counterexamples are in tension with a principle 
weaker than the one linking abilities and possibilities. 
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Here’s a highly intuitive principle linking abilities and possibilities: 
Poss-Ability: (For all S and all Φ) If S is able to Φ, then it is metaphysically possible 
that S Φ’s. 
In addition to being intuitive, Poss-Ability underwrites much contemporary 
theorizing about abilities. For example, it is a consequence of both of the leading 
metaphysical analyses of abilities,1 and it mediates the connection between ‘ought’ 
and the ‘can’ of metaphysical possibility.2 
Much hangs, then, on the truth of Poss-Ability. In this note, I argue against 
Jack Spencer’s class of counterexamples to Poss-Ability by drawing on 
considerations from epistemic logic to renew an argument against these 
counterexamples based on the unknowability of Fitch propositions.3 
Spencer’s class of counterexamples centers around the following case:4 
Simple G: Consider a fully deterministic world w.5 Let ‘H’ name the complete 
                                                        
1 See 481-483 within Jack Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” Mind 126, 502 (2017):466-497. 
2 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 486-488. 
3 For other arguments against the G-cases, see Anthony Nguyen, “Unable to Do the Impossible,” 
Mind 129, 514 (2020): 585-602. 
4 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 468. 
5 A world w is deterministic just in case a complete specification of the laws of w and the state of 
w at any time entails a complete specification of the state of w at any other time. See Carl Hoefer 




specification of the initial conditions of w and ‘L’ name the complete 
specification of the laws of nature of w. Suppose that H ∧ L is common 
knowledge in G’s community; it is taught in high school physics 
classes. G is one the top students in her class and is excellent in physics 
as well. However, for one accidental reason or another G misses the 
class in which her teacher covers the laws and initial conditions and 
so never comes to believe H ∧ L or know H ∧ L, though many of her 
classmates do. 
Spencer judges that in Simple G, G is able to know H ∧ L. This quickly leads to the 
falsity of Poss-Ability, since it is metaphysically impossible that G knows H ∧ L.6 
Simple G serves as something of a template for generating counterexamples to Poss-
Ability. For example, in Gettier G, G truly believes H ∧ L but fails to know H ∧ L for 
Gettier-like reasons.7 Following Spencer, I call cases like these G-cases.8 
There is an argument from the unknowability of Fitch propositions against 
the G-cases.9 Letting ‘KGΦ’ regiment the claim ‘G knows that Φ,’ Fitch propositions 
are of the form ‘Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ.’ The unknowability of Fitch propositions is the thesis 
that no one is able to know a Fitch proposition. In other words, it is the claim that: 
Unknowability of Fitch propositions: ∀S∀Φ(S is not able to know that Φ ∧ ￢KSΦ). 
Spencer considers the following argument from the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions to the claim that G is not able to know H ∧ L: Suppose that G is able to 
know H ∧ L. H ∧ L entails ￢KG(H ∧ L). Now if knowability for G is closed under 
entailment, then G is able to know that ￢KG(H ∧ L). If knowability for G is further 
closed under conjunction, it follows that G is able to know (H ∧ L) ∧ (￢KG(H ∧ L). 
But this is a Fitch proposition. It follows from the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions that our assumption is false, so G is not able to know H ∧ L. 
I agree with Spencer that this argument is no good. The problem is that there 
is no reason to think that knowability for G is closed under entailment or 
conjunction. There are many ordinary agents for whom it is not plausible that they 
are able to know every consequence of anything they know. Moreover Spencer 
                                                        
6 If H ∧ L is false, then G does not know H ∧ L, since knowledge requires truth. But if H ∧ L is true, 
then G does not know H ∧ L, since H ∧ L entails that G does not come to know H ∧ L. C.f. Spencer, 
“Able to Do the Impossible.” 469 and 490. 
7 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 477-478. 
8 In this note, I restrict my attention to G-cases involving the ability to know. Spencer does discuss 
some counterexamples to Poss-Ability that do not involve the ability to know. For discussion of 
these, see Nguyen, “Unable to do the Impossible,” section 4. 
9 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 489-491. 
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argues that if Fitch propositions are unknowable, then knowability is not closed 
under either conjunction or known entailment.10 
However, there is an improved version of the objection which circumvents 
these problems. The crucial point is that the properties of knowability may differ 
when the abilities of different agents are in question. While knowability in general 
is not closed under entailment or conjunction, there is still a limited class of agents 
for whom their ability to know is closed under entailment and conjunction. In 
particular, consider the class of idealized agents who are both metaphysically 
omniscient and have perfect introspective access to their own epistemic states. A 
metaphysically omniscient agent C is such that: 
Whenever C knows all of the formulas in a set Γ (including the empty set) and A 
follows logically/metaphysically from Γ, then C also knows A.11 
Metaphysical omniscience guarantees that knowability is closed under logical and 
metaphysical entailment. Perfect introspection (for an agent S) is characterized by 
at least the following principles: 
KK Principle: KSΦ → KSKSΦ 
Consistent Introspection: BS￢BSΦ → ￢BSΦ.12 
Given metaphysical omniscience, whenever S knows Φ and Φ entails Ψ, S knows 
Ψ. Given the KK principle, if S knows Φ and S knows Ψ, then S knows that S knows 
both of these. Thus if S is able to know Φ and Φ entails Ψ, S is in a position to know 
Φ ∧ Ψ. So the relevant kind of closure invoked by the argument against G-cases does 
hold for this class of idealized agents. 
The new and improved version of the argument then says that if an idealized 
version of G, namely G+, for whom the above conditions held were able to know H 
∧ L, then they would be able to know a Fitch proposition, namely (H ∧ L) ∧ (￢
KG+(H ∧ L)). But since no one is able to know a Fitch proposition, G+ is not able to 
know H ∧ L. The final step of the argument is simply the claim that if a highly 
                                                        
10 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 490-491. 
11 This definition appears in Rendsvig and Symons, “Epistemic Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (2019). 
12 Consistent Introspection follows from the belief analogue of the KK principle plus a weak 
principle on rational belief: 
(1) BGΦ→BGBGΦ    (BB Principle) 
(2) BGBGΦ→~BG~BGΦ   (Weak Rational Belief) 
(3) BGΦ→~BG~BGΦ     (1, 2, PL) 
(4) BG~BGΦ→~BGΦ     (3, PL) 
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idealized version of G would be unable to know H ∧ L, then plain old G is not able 
to know H ∧ L simply for failure to satisfy the relevant closure conditions. 
Against this improved version of the Fitch objection, several of Spencer’s 
responses simply fall flat. First, I already mentioned that Spencer argues that if Fitch 
propositions are unknowable, then knowability is not closed under either 
conjunction or known entailment. But the relevant question is, knowability for 
whom? Both of Spencer’s counterexamples here are for agents who lack knowledge 
of certain mathematical truths.13 Assuming that mathematical truths are 
metaphysically necessary, these agents fail to be metaphysically omniscient. 
Therefore, these counterexamples cannot show that knowability is not closed under 
conjunction or entailment for the relevant idealized kind of agent. 
Second, Spencer objects that: 
Although ￢K(H ∧ L) may be necessitated by H ∧ L, it need not be scrutable on the 
basis of H ∧ L, so there is no reason to think that G (or G+) ought to be able to know 
that ◻(H ∧ L →￢K(H ∧ L)). Thus, even if the threatening argument is sound – 
which I doubt very much – there would still be some G-cases that did not lead to 
the knowability of Fitch propositions, and so the main claims of this paper would 
stand.14 
But I respond that if G+ is metaphysically omniscient, then there is eminently good 
reason to think that G+ ought to be able to know that ◻(H ∧ L →￢KG+(H ∧ L)), since 
metaphysically omniscient agents know every metaphysically necessary truth. The 
second part of the quoted passage seems to suggest that even if the fact that H ∧ L 
entails ￢KG(H ∧ L) is knowable for some G in some G case, say for metaphysically 
omniscient G+, we still might maintain that there are some G-cases which do not 
lead to knowability of Fitch propositions, particularly where G is not able to know 
◻(H ∧ L →￢KG(H ∧ L)). But, as I have suggested, this sort of reasoning is perverse. 
If a metaphysically omniscient version of G is not able to know H ∧ L, surely G is 
not able to know H ∧ L merely out of ignorance of the metaphysical truth that H ∧ 
L entails ￢KG(H ∧ L). 
Spencer’s third response to objections based on the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions is the most interesting. He proposes to bite the bullet on the 
knowability of Fitch propositions, since the main argument for their unknowability 
depends on Poss-Ability. There is a simple proof that it is not metaphysically possible 
to know a Fitch proposition, first reported by Frederich Fitch.15 The proof 
                                                        
13 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” fn 43. 
14 Spencer, “Able to Do the Impossible,” 490. 
15 Frederich Fitch, “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 
28, 2 (1963). 
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demonstrates that knowledge of a Fitch proposition would require both knowing 
and not knowing some proposition, which is of course impossible: 
(1) ◻(K(Φ ∧ ￢KΦ)  → (KΦ ∧ K￢KΦ)) (Knowledge distributes over conjunction) 
(2) ◻((KΦ ∧ K￢KΦ) → (KΦ ∧ ￢KΦ)) (Factivity of knowledge) 
(3) ◻(K(Φ ∧ ￢KΦ)  → (KΦ ∧ ￢KΦ)) (1, 2, PL, K axiom)16 
(4) ◻￢(KΦ ∧ ￢KΦ)   (PL) 
(5) ◻￢(K(Φ ∧ ￢KΦ))  (3, 4, PL, K axiom) 
Interpreting ‘◻’ as a metaphysical necessity operator, the above result shows that it 
is metaphysically impossible to know a Fitch proposition, provided agents satisfy the 
plausible distribution over conjunction condition. What Spencer points out is that 
to conclude that no one is able to know a Fitch proposition on the basis of this 
argument depends on an application of Poss-Ability. Spencer could allow that it is 
metaphysically impossible to know a Fitch proposition, yet resist the claim that they 
are unknowable in the sense of ability. 
Spencer calls for a new argument to be given for the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions. This seems something of a double standard. No argument is given for 
the claim that G is able to know H ∧ L. If it came down to a clash of intuitions, I 
would favor the unknowability of Fitch propositions over Spencer’s judgment in G-
cases. Nonetheless, there is at least one independent argument for the unknowability 
of Fitch propositions. It relies on a principle weaker than Poss-Ability, namely: 
Believe-Ability: If S is able to know Φ, then it is metaphysically possible for S to 
believe Φ. 
This principle is highly plausible and nothing in the G-cases prima facie rules it out, 
since there may be many worlds where G falsely believes H ∧ L, and Gettier-G 
explicitly relies on the construction that G believes H ∧ L. 
                                                        
16 ‘PL’ stands for ‘propositional logic’ and the K axiom of normal modal logics is as follows: 
K Axiom: ◻(Φ → Ψ) → (◻Φ → ◻Ψ) 
Many proofs in this paper appeal to the combination of PL and the K axiom to make inferences 
valid in propositional logic within the scope of the metaphysical necessity operator. To see that 
this is valid, suppose that Φ → Ψ is provable in PL. Since anything provable in PL is metaphysically 
necessary, ◻(Φ → Ψ) follows. Then by the K axiom, ◻Φ → ◻Ψ is true. So if we begin with some 
formula ◻Φ and Φ → Ψ is provable in PL, we may conclude ◻Ψ by applications of PL and the K 
axiom. Alternatively, to see that this is valid one may simply reflect on the fact that the logical 
consequences of any metaphysically necessary truth are also metaphysically necessary. 
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We can show if Believe-Ability is true, then any agent S who satisfies a kind 
of epistemic anti-akrasia constraint is not able to know a Fitch proposition: 
Anti-Akrasia: BS￢KSΦ → ￢BSΦ. 
Anti-Akrasia says that if S introspects and comes to believe that they do not know 
Φ, they will not believe Φ. Just as doing what’s best is the aim of action, knowledge 
is the aim of belief. So as an akratic person Ψ’s whilst believing that Ψ-ing is not the 
best option overall, an epistemically akratic person believes Φ whilst believing that 
they do not know Φ. I take Anti-Akrasia to express a plausible principle of perfect 
rationality. 
Anti-Akrasia and Believe-Abilitity together imply the unknowability of Fitch 
propositions, since believing a Fitch proposition involves believing both Φ and that 
you don’t know Φ. Letting ‘AGΦ’ regiment the claim that G is able to bring it about 
that Φ: 
(1) ◻(BG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ) → (BGΦ ∧ BG￢KGΦ))             (BG distribution over conjunction) 
(2) ◻￢(BGΦ ∧ BG￢KGΦ)   (Anti-Akrasia, PL, K axiom) 
(3) ◻￢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ))   (1, 2, PL, K axiom) 
(4) ￢♢￢￢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ))    (3, Duality of ◻) 
(5) ￢♢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ))    (4, PL) 
(6) AGKG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ) → ♢BG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ) (Believe-Ability) 
(7) ￢AGKG(Φ ∧ ￢KGΦ)    (5, 6, PL) 
The above proof shows that given Believe-Ability, no agent satisfying distribution 
of belief over conjunction and Anti-Akrasia is able to know a Fitch proposition. A 
metaphysically omniscient agent satisfies the distribution constraint, and a perfectly 
rational agent satisfies Anti-Akrasia. Therefore, no metaphysically omniscient and 
perfectly rational agent is able to know a Fitch proposition.17 And here I extend this 
argument in a familiar way – if such idealized agents cannot know Fitch 
propositions, then we mere mortals cannot either. 
These results can be extended in several dimensions. First, I note that in non-
Gettier G-cases where G does not believe H ∧ L, that conjunction will entail that G 
                                                        
17 Since we rely on necessitated versions of principles such as Anti-Akrasia in these proofs, what 
really follows is that no necessarily metaphysically omniscient and necessarily perfectly rational 
agent is able to know a Fitch proposition. This does not seem to me to diminish at all the strength 
of the inference to our inability to know such propositions, since all we have done is idealized 
these agents to be even more godlike. In what follows I leave implicit the clarification made here, 
but it applies throughout. 
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does not believe H ∧ L. Therefore, by another argument relying on closure over 
entailment and conjunction, idealized G+ is able to know H ∧ L in non-Gettier G-
cases only if G+ is able to know (H ∧ L) ∧ ￢BG+(H ∧ L). By a structurally identical 
proof as above, we can show that this violates Believe-Ability whilst relying on 
weaker assumptions. We trade out Anti-Akrasia for Consistent Introspection: 
(1) ◻(BG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ) → (BGΦ ∧ BG￢BGΦ))              (BG distribution over conjunction) 
(2) ◻￢(BGΦ ∧ BG￢BGΦ)   (CI, PL, K axiom) 
(3) ◻￢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ))   (1, 2, PL, K axiom) 
(4) ￢♢￢￢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ))    (3, Duality of ◻) 
(5) ￢♢(BG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ))    (4, PL) 
(6) AGKG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ) → ♢BG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ) (Believe-Ability) 
(7) ￢AGKG(Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ)    (5, 6, PL) 
Since Consistent Introspection is guaranteed simply from having perfect access to 
one’s epistemic states, the above shows no metaphysically omniscient agent G with 
perfect introspection can know a proposition of the form Φ ∧ ￢BGΦ. But non-
Gettier G-cases require this ability. 
Second, it can actually be shown that G-cases are more generally in tension 
with Believe-Ability. The following principle follows by metaphysical omniscience: 
Belief Follows Entailment: ◻(Φ → Ψ) → ◻(BGΦ → BGΨ). 
This fact may be exploited to show that the conjunction of Believe-Ability and Anti-
Akrasia rules out all G-cases, and the conjunction of Believe-Ability and Consistent 
Introspection rules out all non-Gettier G-cases. 
As we have already noted, in all G-cases, H ∧ L entails that ￢KG(H ∧ L). Given 
this, we show that no agent G satisfying Belief Follows Entailment and Anti-Akrasia 
can know H ∧ L, since G believing H ∧ L would also require G believing that G does 
not know H ∧ L: 
(1) ◻(H ∧ L → ￢KG(H ∧ L))    (H ∧ L entailment) 
(2) ◻(BG(H ∧ L) → BG￢KG(H ∧ L))   (1, Belief Follows Entailment) 
(3) ◻(BG￢KG(H ∧ L) → ￢BG(H ∧ L))  (Anti-Akrasia) 
(4) ◻(BG(H ∧ L) → ￢BG(H ∧ L))  (2, 3, PL, K axiom) 
(5) ◻(￢(BG(H ∧ L) ∧ ￢￢BG(H ∧ L)))   (4, PL, K axiom) 
(6) ◻(￢BG(H ∧ L))    (5, PL, K axiom) 
(7) ￢◇￢￢BG(H ∧ L)   (6, Duality of ◻) 
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(8) ￢◇BG(H ∧ L)    (7, PL) 
(9) AGKG(H ∧ L) → ◇BG(H ∧ L)  (Believe-Ability) 
(10) ￢AGKG(H ∧ L)     (8, 9, PL) 
Plausibly, a metaphysically omniscient, perfectly rational agent would satisfy the 
principles relied on above. Therefore no such agent is able to know H ∧ L. Again, I 
conclude from this that no lesser agent can either. 
Finally, in any non-Gettier G-case H ∧ L entails that ￢BG(H ∧ L). This means 
that the above argument can be run against any non-Gettier G-case again trading 
Anti-Akrasia for Consistent Introspection, since G believing H ∧ L would then 
require G believing that G does not believe H ∧ L (the proofs are identical in steps 
4-10): 
(1) ◻(H ∧ L → ￢BG(H ∧ L))    (H ∧ L entailment) 
(2) ◻(BG(H ∧ L) → BG￢BG(H ∧ L))   (1, Belief Follows Entailment) 
(3) ◻(BG￢BG(H ∧ L) → ￢BG(H ∧ L))  (Consistent Introspection) 
(4) ◻(BG(H ∧ L) → ￢BG(H ∧ L))  (2, 3, PL, K axiom) 
(5) ◻(￢(BG(H ∧ L) ∧ ￢￢BG(H ∧ L)))   (4, PL, K axiom) 
(6) ◻(￢BG(H ∧ L))    (5, PL, K axiom) 
(7) ￢◇￢￢BG(H ∧ L)   (6, Duality of ◻) 
(8) ￢◇BG(H ∧ L)    (7, PL) 
(9) AGKG(H ∧ L) → ◇BG(H ∧ L)  (Believe-Ability) 
(10) ￢AGKG(H ∧ L)     (8, 9, PL) 
I reiterate that an agent with total introspective access satisfies Consistent 
Introspection. So no metaphysically omniscient, perfectly introspective agent can 
know H ∧ L in any non-Gettier G-case. 
It is worth noting that even if you disagree with some of my assessments about 
what principles certain idealized agents satisfy, the broader point is that these results 
show that if Believe-Ability holds, then any agent who did satisfy these constraints 
could not know a Fitch proposition or H ∧ L. And it seems dubious to hold that 
someone is able to know H ∧ L only by failing to satisfy some of these constraints. 
To summarize, I argued that agents satisfying certain closure principles on 
knowability are able to know H ∧ L only if they are able to know a Fitch proposition. 
Contra Spencer, if one thinks, as seems intuitive, that Fitch propositions are 
unknowable, one should conclude not only that such agents are unable to know H 
∧ L, but that even lesser agents who do not satisfy these conditions are unable to 
The Poss-Ability Principle, G-cases, and Fitch Propositions 
125 
know H ∧ L, since one surely cannot know a proposition simply because of ignorance 
of its consequences. I then gave an independent argument for the unknowability of 
Fitch propositions based on Believe-Ability, a principle even weaker than Poss-
Ability. Finally, I pointed out that Believe-Ability rules out the G-cases even 
independently of the argument about Fitch propositions. Therefore, both the 
unknowability of Fitch propositions and Believe-Ability are good reasons to reject 
Spencer’s counterexamples to Poss-Ability.18 
                                                        
18 Thanks to Gabriel Uzquiano, Giang Le, Kadri Vihvelin, John Hawthorne, and especially Jeff 
Russell for helpful comments. 
